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ACCOUNTANTS' LIABILITY - THE
SCIENTER STANDARD UNDER
SECTION 10b AND RULE 10b-5 OF
THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF
1934
CRAIG M. WALKER*
The recent decision of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit in McLean v. Alexander' has sparked
renewed debate on the scienter requirement for the liability of
accountants and auditors under section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 19342 and rule 10b-5 promulgated thereun-
der.3 The purpose of this article is to review the elements of a
section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 violation, and to examine the
* B.A., Williams College, 1969; J.D., Cornell University, 1972. Mr. Walker is an
associate in the firm of Alexander & Green, New York, N.Y., and a member of the
New York Bar.
1. 599 F.2d 1190 (3d Cir. 1979). This case was first tried and decided in 1978. 449
F. Supp. 1251 (D. Del. 1978).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)(1976). Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
[hereinafter cited as the 1934 Act] provides in pertinent part as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange -
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not
so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may pre-
scribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the pro-
tection of investors.
3. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1979). Rule 10b-5, promulgated under section 10(b) of
the 1934 Act, provides as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
4. Traditionally, complaints also include claims made under other provisions of
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current status of the scienter element. A brief comparison will
then be made between these elements and the principles for
accountants' liability under the American Law Institute's Pro-
posed Federal Securities Code,5 presently being studied by the
the federal securities laws, under common law, and under state Blue Sky laws.
The principles under sections 14(a) and 14(e) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n(a)
and 78n(e), are similar to the standards under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5. Sections
11 and 12 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k and 771, specify bases for accountant's
liability as well as defenses. The Supreme Court has recently ruled that no private
cause of action for damages is implied under section 17(a) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77q. Redington v. Touche Ross & Co., 99 S. Ct. 2479 (1979), rehearing denied, 99 S.
Ct. 3095 (1979).
Additionally, it has been stated that secondary liability for aiding and abetting a
violation of federal securities law may arise upon a showing: "(1) that there has been
a commission of a wrongful act - an underlying securities violation; (2) that the
alleged aider and abettor had knowledge of that act; and, (3) that the aider-abettor
knowingly and substantially participated in the wrongdoing." Monsen v. Consoli-
dated Dressed Beef Co., 579 F.2d 793, 799 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. First Pa.
Bank v. Monsen, 439 U.S. 930 (1978) (indicating that where aider and abettor derived
benefit from wrongdoing, knowledge requirement could be satisfied by "constructive
notice of intended impropriety"); but cf. Murphy v. McDonnell & Co., 553 F.2d 292,
295-96 (2d Cir. 1977)(holding that while scienter would satisfy the knowing participa-
tion requirement, stock exchange had no duty to disclose results of investigation of
firm to sophisticated lenders who had not sought exchange's advice); Hirsch v. du
Pont, 553 F.2d 750, 759 (2d Cir. 1977)(holding stock exchange not liable as aider and
abettor to fraudulent merger where exchange knew of undisclosed material facts but
not of fraud); Hochfelder v. Midwest Stock Exch., 503 F.2d 364, 374 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 875 (1974) (there, the court said to invoke liability for aiding and
abetting solely by inaction, "investors must show that the party charged with aiding
and abetting had knowledge of or, but for a breach of duty of inquiry, should have
had knowledge of the fraud, and that possessing such knowledge the party failed to
act due to an improper motive or breach of a duty of disclosure."); Kerbs v. Fall
River Indus., Inc., 502 F.2d 731 (10th Cir. 1974) (holding that mere presence at a
meeting satisfied substantial participation requirement).
Courts also often look to the common law in formulating federal securities law
claims, and most cases against accountants also include common-law claims, with ele-
ments varied among the separate states. See generally Annot., 46 A.L.R.3d 979
(1972). Liability may be grounded in fraud, Liodas v. Sahadi, 19 Cal. 3d 278, 562 P.2d
316, 137 Cal. Rptr. 635 (1977); Rudman v. Cowles Communications, Inc., 30 N.Y.2d 1,
280 N.E.2d 867, 330 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1972); in deceit or negligent misrepresentation,
Gagne v. Bertran, 43 Cal. 2d 481, 275 P.2d 15 (1954); or in negligence, Linder v.
Barlow, Davis & Wood, 210 Cal. App. 2d 660, 27 Cal. Rptr. 101 (1962), International
Prods. Co. v. Erie R.R., 244 N.Y. 331, 155 N.E. 662 (1927). See appendix for a com-
parison of common-law theories of liability in California and New York. See also text
accompanying notes 20-21 infra.
Additionally, the Blue Sky laws of the separate states should not be overlooked.
See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 25401 (West 1977); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 339-a (McKin-
ney 1968); Wis. STAT. ch. 551 (1977).




Securities and Exchange Commission, which attempts to es-
tablish a unified scheme of liability.
I. SECTION 10(b) AND RULE 10b-5 OF THE 1934 ACT
To recover for violations of section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder,
plaintiff need only prove by a fair preponderance of the evi-
dence6 that the defendants, in connection with the purchase
and sale of securities, (1) through the use of interstate instru-
mentalities, (2) made false or misleading misrepresentations
or omissions which were (3) material and as to which (4) de-
fendants had the requisite "scienter," (5) that plaintiff relied
on the representations in making its purchases of the securi-
ties and (6) that plaintiff suffered damages as a result.
A. Use of Interstate Instrumentalities
This jurisdictional requirement is satisfied by a showing
that, in connection with plaintiff's purchase of securities, de-
fendants, directly or indirectly, individually or through any
agent, used the United States mails or engaged in interstate
travel or transportation, or participated in telephone conver-
sations.7 At least five circuits have ruled that in the case of
telephone usage, even intrastate calls suffice because the in-
strumentality used is an interstate instrumentality.8
B. Misrepresentations and Omissions
Misrepresentations and omissions chargeable to defen-
6. Fey v. Walston & Co., 493 F.2d 1036, 1049 (7th Cir. 1974); Dzenits v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 494 F.2d 168, 171 n.2 (10th Cir. 1974); Myzel v.
Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968). See also SEC
v. Joiner, 320 U.S. 344, 355 (1943), arising under Sections 5 and 17 of the Securities
Act of 1933: "Where this proof is offered in a civil action, as here, a preponderance of
the evidence will establish the case."
7. Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374, 378-79 (10th Cir. 1965); Ellis v. Carter, 291
F.2d 270, 274 (9th Cir. 1961); Matheson v. Armbrust, 284 F.2d 670, 672-73 (9th Cir.
1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 870 (1961); Reube v. Pharmacodynamics, Inc., 348 F.
Supp. 900, 912 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Levin v. Marder, 343 F. Supp. 1050, 1056 (W.D. Pa.
1972).
8. See Spilker v. Shayne Laboratories, 520 F.2d 523, 526 (9th Cir. 1975): "There-
fore, we join the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Tenth Circuits holding expressly that the
intrastate use of telephone confers federal jurisdiction under §10 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, and S.E.C. Rule 10b-5 where the telephone calls in question
are connected to the transaction of which there is a complaint."
1979]
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dant-accountants can arise in diverse factual settings, from
false financial statements to misleading opinion letters.9
Where the accountant prepares audited financial statements,
liability can be grounded upon (1) substantially understated
allowances for doubtful accounts on balance sheets and state-
ments of operations, (2) grossly overstated reported revenues,
(3) understated deficits and (4) concomitant misstatements of
assets and stockholder's equity.
For example, in the case of a fledgling company the
financial statements may present a picture of a company
which had successfully come through its start-up phase, over-
coming deficits and emerging with a profit. Yet the facts at
trial may show the audited company had never made a profit
and its deficits had been consistently large, while these truths
were masked by the gross understatements of the company's
provisions and allowances for doubtful accounts on its
financial statements. Additionally, the further facts may show
that the company's revenues had been falsely inflated through
the practice of accruing certain revenues which the company
had no reasonable expectation of receiving.
Similarly, the accountants will state in their opinion and
report that their examination was made in accordance with
generally accepted auditing standards. The facts at trial, how-
ever, may show departures from and violations of generally
accepted auditing standards, such as the acceptance of data
(e.g., credit criteria, write-offs, provisions for doubtful ac-
counts, internal control procedures of the company) without
audit tests or procedures to verify the accuracy of such data
(in the face of knowledge that the data was subject to the dis-
tortions), or the acceptance of data when limited tests evi-
dence discrepancies (e.g., reporting accrued revenues and re-
ceivables when the competent evidential matter in the hands
of the accountants demonstrates that the bases for such ac-
cruals were non-existent). Other departures from generally ac-
cepted auditing standards include employing inadequate qual-
ifications in the opinion (e.g., sanctioning the presentation of
9. For a dated general discussion of principles of liability, including misrepresen-
tation, see Symposium on Accounting and the Federal Securities Laws, 28 VAND. L.




financial statements on a going concern, rather than a liquida-
tion, basis when from the cash and income forecasts reviewed
by the accountants, it was known that the assumptions on
which the company's viability was projected were false), af-
firmatively including false statements (e.g., "subsequently the
company has improved its operations to a profitable level"),
and expressing an opinion as to the financial statements when
the accountants lacked the basis on which to do so.
Accountants, however, will often defend against these
charges with the claim that they were themselves deceived by
the management of the audited company. For the opposing
view, plaintiffs maintain that accountants are not to be ex-
cused from detection of fraud if observance of generally ac-
cepted auditing standards would uncover the fraud. This lat-
ter point was well made by the SEC, in In re Touche Ross &
Co.,10 where the accounting firm consented to the entry of an
SEC disciplinary order resulting from its audit of U.S. Finan-
cial, Inc. (USF). In that matter the SEC addressed the ques-
tion of deception of the auditor as follows:
While it appears that [the accountant] was deliberately
misled in many respects by USF's management in the course
of the 1970 and 1971 audits, [the accountant's] failure in a
number of respects to conduct these engagements in accor-
dance with generally accepted auditing standards makes
[the accountant] responsible for certifying financial state-
ments which proved to be materially false and misleading.
As the Commission stated in its report on McKesson & Rob-
bins, Inc.:
".. .[W]e believe that... [with respect to] examina-
tions for corporations whose securities are held by the
public, accountants can be expected to detect gross
overstatements of assets and profits, whether resulting
from fraud or otherwise. We believe that alertness on
the part of the entire [audit] staff, coupled with intelli-
10. 6 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) % 72,175 (February 25, 1974). For additional cases
discussing the effect of deviations from generally accepted accounting procedures and
generally accepted auditing standards, see SEC v. Arthur Young & Co., 590 F.2d 785
(9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Weiner, [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP.
(CCH) 96,541 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1006 (1970); SEC v. Chatham, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 96,911 (D. Utah 1979).
1979]
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gent analysis by experienced accountants of the man-
ner of doing business, should detect overstatements in
the accounts, regardless of their cause, long before they
assume the magnitude reached in this case. Further-
more, an examination of this kind should not, in our
opinion, exclude the highest officers of the corporation
from its appraisal of the manner in which the business
under review is conducted. . .. [W]e feel that the dis-
covery of gross overstatements in the accounts is a ma-
jor purpose of. . . an audit . . .-.
The SEC also cited the following:
As stated in the AICPA's recently issued Statement on
Auditing Standards § 110.05 (1973), which was substantially
a restatement of existing practice, in making an ordinary ex-
amination, the auditor must be alert to and recognize "the
possibility that fraud may exist" and that fraud, "if suffi-
ciently material, may affect his opinion on the financial
statements. . . ." Accordingly, "his examination, made in
accordance with generally accepted auditing standards, gives
consideration to this possibility," even though the ordinary
examination is not "primarily or specifically designed" to
detect fraud. The failure, therefore, to conduct an examina-
tion in accordance with generally accepted auditing stan-
dards means that the auditor is responsible for his failure to
detect fraud when such failure results from a departure from
auditing standards. 2
The SEC further said, in pertinent part, as follows:
1. An independent examination is a check on representa-
tions of management however honest and competent that
management may be, and reliance on managerial virtues is
not a check.
2. Banks sometimes make character loans, but there is no
such thing as a character audit.
3. Defalcations are nearly always perpetrated by old and
trusted employees of good reputations."3
11. 6 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 72,175 at 62,360 (footnotes omitted).
12. Id. at 62,363 n.11.




The commonly applied test of materiality under section
10(b) and rule 10b-5 is whether a reasonable person would at-
tach importance to the fact misrepresented or omitted in de-
termining his choice of action in the transaction in question.14
In most cases involving accountant's liability, materiality
seems obvious where the financial statements are inaccurate,
because financial statements are usually the cornerstone of an
investment decision.
For instance, there is little doubt about the significance to
any investor of the fact that a company might be: (1) holding
vast numbers of uncollectible accounts on its books; (2) com-
puting its provisions and allowances for doubtful accounts
under a false formula; or (3) accruing and reporting revenues
on false assumptions. Nor can anyone doubt the importance
to an investor of the fact that a company was piling up mas-
sive deficits when its accountants were reporting that the
financial statements to the contrary had been audited and
were fairly presented.
In some instances, however, accountants could counter
with the argument that the investment decision involves the
purchase of a "concept" instead of tangible assets. This argu-
ment, of course, derives from the situation where many
14. This test is from RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, § 528(2)a (1938), quoted in North-
west Paper Corp. v. Thompson, 421 F.2d 137 (9th Cir. 1970). In Lewelling v. First
Cal. Co., 564 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1977), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals said,
"[T]he Supreme Court has yet to announce a precise test for materiality under Rule
lOb-5. In the Ninth Circuit, the Northwest Paper formulation still controls." See also
Robinson v. Cupples Container Co., 513 F.2d 1274, 1277 (9th Cir. 1975); Marx v.
Computer Sciences Corp., 507 F.2d 485, 489 (9th Cir. 1974); Gilbert v. Nixon, 429
F.2d 348, 355-56 (10th Cir. 1970); List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d
Cir. 1965), cert. denied sub nom. List v. Lerner, 382 U.S. 811 (1965). In TSC Indus.,
Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976), materiality with respect to fact or
omissions in proxy solicitation material governed by rule 14a-9 was defined by the
Supreme Court as follows:
An omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable
shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote .... What
the standard does contemplate is a showing of a substantial likelihood that,
under all the circumstances, the omitted fact would have assumed actual sig-
nificance in the deliberations of the reasonable shareholder. Put another way,
there must be a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact
would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly al-
tered the "total mix" of information made available.
Cf. ALI PROPOSED CODE § 293 (adopting the TSC Industries definition of "material").
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fledgling companies are purchased based on a product, mar-
keting device, or other unique quality which combined with
the audited financial statements makes the company look very
attractive. Often in these situations the price earning multiple
may be extraordinarily high, evidencing excellent growth
possibilities.
While in most cases materiality will not be disputed, where
it is, the accountant's argument will more likely be seen as
addressing the issue of reckless disregard and the scienter
standard under section 10b and rule 10b-5. For example, in
McLean v. Alexander, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals seg-
mented discrepancies in the underlying facts from those pre-
sent in the financial statements, finding that these minimal
discrepancies did not constitute reckless disregard. 15
D. Scienter
In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,'6 an accountant's liability
case where only negligent nonfeasance was claimed, the Court
ruled that the existence of scienter was a necessary element in
establishing liability under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and
rule 10b-5, and defined scienter for the purpose of the case
before it, as a "mental state embracing intent to deceive, ma-
nipulate, or defraud."'" It is axiomatic that knowing falsity
constitutes scienter. The Court acknowledged this in
Hochfelder, holding that the words of section 10(b) "strongly
suggest that §10(b) was intended to proscribe knowing or in-
tentional misconduct.' 8 Because the issue was not before it,
the Court declined to address the question of liability for
reckless behavior after stating in the oft-cited footnote twelve
that "[i]n certain areas of the law recklessness is considered to
be a form of intentional conduct for purposes of imposing lia-
bility for some act."'19
The concept that a defendant may be held liable for state-
ments made with reckless disregard for truth or falsity is, of
course, rooted in the common-law concept enunciated by then
15. See text accompanying notes 16-53 infra.
16. 425 U.S. 185 (1976), rehearing denied, 425 U.S. 986 (1976).
17. Id. at 194 n.12.
18. Id. at 197 (emphasis added)(footnotes omitted). See also Herzfeld v.
Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 540 F.2d 27, 33 (2d Cir. 1976).
19. Id. at 193-94 n.12.
[Vol. 63:243
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Judge Cardozo in the landmark case of Ultramares Corp. v.
Touche,20 where the court said:
Our holding does not emancipate accountants from the
consequences of fraud. It does not relieve them if their audit
has been so negligent as to justify a finding that they had no
genuine belief in its adequacy, for this again is fraud.
We conclude, to sum up the situation, that in certifying
to the correspondence between balance sheet and accounts
the defendants made a statement as true to their own
knowledge, when they had, as a jury might find, no knowl-
edge on the subject. If that is so, they may also be found to
have acted without information leading to a sincere or genu-
ine belief when they certified to an opinion that the balance
sheet faithfully reflected the condition of the business. 21
The Seventh Circuit in several recent cases22 has quoted
from Franke v. Midwestern Oklahoma Development Author-
ity,2" which describes the applicable recklessness standard in
the context of omissions as follows:
[R]eckless conduct may be defined as a highly unreasonable
omission, involving not merely simple, or even inexcusable
negligence, but an extreme departure from the standards of
ordinary care, and which presents a danger of misleading
buyers or sellers, that is either known to the defendant or is
so obvious that the actor must have been aware of it.
24
The Second Circuit in Lanza v. Drexel & Co:,25 explained
the recklessness standard as follows:
In determining was [sic] constitutes "willful or reckless
disregard for the truth" the inquiry normally will be to de-
termine whether the defendants knew the material facts
misstated or omitted, or failed or refused, after being put on
20. 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
21. Id. at 189, 192-93, 174 N.E. at 448-50.
22. Wright v. Heitzer Corp., 560 F.2d 236, 251-52 (7th Cir. 1977); Sanders v. John
Nuveen & Co., 554 F.2d 790, 793 (7th Cir. 1977); Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem.
Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1044 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977), where the
court stated that while scienter involved an objective test, "the circumstances must
be viewed in their contemporaneous configuration rather than in the blazing light of
hindsight." Id. at 1045 n.19.
23. 428 F.Supp. 719 (W.D. Okla. 1976).
24. Id. at 725.
25. 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973)(en banc).
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notice of a possible material failure of disclosure, to apprise
themselves of the facts where they could have done so with-
out any extraordinary effort.2
A number of courts have, subsequent to Hochfelder, con-
sidered whether recklessness fulfills the scienter requirement
of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5, and a number of them have
held that it does.
For example, the Ninth Circuit in Nelson v. Serwold2a ad-
dressed the question squarely and held as follows:
Although the Supreme Court left undecided the question
whether recklessness is sufficient to support liability under
Rule 10b-5, distinguished jurists have long considered it
so.... And since Ernst & Ernst, courts have continued to
assess Rule 10b-5 liability for reckless behavior.
Ernst & Ernst, we think, only went so far as to eliminate
26. Id. at 1306.n.98.
27. Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1023-25 (6th Cir. 1979);
Hoffman v. Eastbrook, 587 F.2d 509, 515-17 (1st Cir. 1978); Nelson v. Serwold, 576
F.2d 1332, 1337-38 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 970 (1978); Cook v. Avien, Inc.,
573 F.2d 685, 692 (1st Cir. 1978); Rolf v. Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., Inc., 570 F.2d
38, 44-47 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978); Coleco Indus., Inc. v. Berman,
567 F.2d 569, 574 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 830, rehearing denied, 439
U.S. 998 (1978); Wright v. Heizer Corp., 560 F.2d 236, 251-52 (7th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978); First Va. Bankshares v. Benson, 559 F.2d 1307, 1314
(5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 952 (1978); Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem.
Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1044-45 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977); Sanders v.
John Nuveen & Co., 554 F.2d 790, 793 (7th Cir. 1977); Oleck v. Fischer, [1979 Trans-
fer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,898 at 95,698-99 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Resnick v.
Touche Ross & Co., 470 F. Supp. 1020, 1022 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Heard v. Savage, [1979
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,787 at 95,092 (W.D. Okla. 1978);
Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 457 F.Supp. 879, 888-89 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Hall v. Secur-
ity Planning Servs., 462 F. Supp. 1058, 1064 (D. Ariz. 1978); Indiana Nat'l Bank v.
Mobil Oil Corp., 457 F. Supp. 1028 (S.D. Ind. 1977); In re Clinton Oil Co. Securities
Litigation, [1977-78 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 96,015 at 91,565-66
(D. Kan. 1977); Braun v. Northern Ohio Bank, 430 F. Supp. 367, 371 (E.D. Ohio
1977).
28. 576 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 970 (1978). While adhering to
the Hochfelder scienter standard, an issue of the foreseeable persons and purview of
the accountants' "duty to disclose" has been raised by the Ninth Circuit and other
courts. See Spectrum Financial Cos. v. Marconsult, Inc., 608 F.2d 377, 381 (9th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 48 U.S.L.W. 3631 (1980); Zwerg v. Hearst Corp., 594 F.2d 1261
(9th Cir. 1979); Competitive Assocs., Inc. v. Laventhol Krekstein, 478 F. Supp. 1328,
1341 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). As such, this consideration is a part of the reliance requirement
but may affect the evaluation of recklessness in a specific factual setting. See, e.g.,
Pegasus Fund v. Laraneta, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,281 at 96,992-93,
(9th Cir., Feb. 14, 1980).
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negligence as a basis for liability. We agree with those courts
which have found that Congress intended the ambit of §
10(b) to reach a broad category of behavior, including know-
ing or reckless conduct.2"
In McLean v. Alexander" the Third Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, which had approved the recklessness standard in Coleco
Industries, Inc. v. Berman,31 sought to define the legal stan-
dard for recklessness with respect to accountants. After a
careful-review of Hochfelder, post-Hochfelder decisions and
the common-law criteria, 2 the Third Circuit formulated the
test as follows:
It seems to us that the purpose of footnote 12 of the
Hochfelder opinion was to preserve, at least in the context
of accountants' liability, the standards of scienter developed
in Ultramares and O'Connor v. Ludlam. And the core re-
quirement of those cases is that the plaintiff establish that
the defendant lacked a genuine belief that the information
disclosed was accurate and complete in all material respects
We stress that to prove scienter the plaintiff need not
produce direct evidence of the defendant's state of mind.
Circumstantial evidence may often be the principal, if not
29. 576 F.2d at 1337-38. See also Note, Rule 10b-5 in the Ninth Circuit - Mate-
riality, Scienter and Damages, Nelson v. Serwold, 12 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 233 (1978).
30. 599 F.2d 1190 (3d Cir. 1979).
31. 567 F.2d 569 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 830, rehearing denied, 439
U.S. 998 (1978).
32. The McLean court cited Nelson v. Serwold, 576 F.2d 1332, 1337-38 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 970 (1978); Cook v. Avien, Inc., 573 F.2d 685, 692 (1st Cir.
1978) (reserving decision on the issue); Rolf v. Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d
38, 44-47 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978); Coleco Indus., Inc. v. Berman,
567 F.2d 569, 574 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 830, reh. denied, 439 U.S. 998
(1978); First Va. Bankshares v. Benson, 559 F.2d 1307, 1314 (5th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 952 (1978); Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033,
1044 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977); O'Connor v. Ludlam, 92 F.2d 50, 54
(2d Cir. 1937); Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931). In
McLean, 599 F.2d at 1198 the Third Circuit quoted the O'Connor decision as follows:
As Judge Swan made clear in O'Connor v. Ludlam, 92 F.2d 50, 54 (2d Cir.
1937), also an accountants' liability case, in an action for fraud under the Ul-
tramares standard:
the issue [is] whether the defendants had an honest belief that the
statements made by them were true. "If they did have that belief,
whether reasonably or unreasonably, they are not liable. If they did not
have an honest belief in the truth of their statements, then they are
liable, so far as [scienter] is concerned."
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the only, means of proving bad faith. A showing of shoddy
accounting practices amounting at best to a "pretended au-
dit," or of grounds supporting a representation "so flimsy as
to lead to the conclusion that there was no genuine belief
back of it" have traditionally supported a finding of liability
in the face of repeated assertions of good faith, and continue
to do so. In such cases, the factfinder may justifiably con-
clude that despite those assertions the "danger of misleading
• .. [was] so obvious that the actor must have been aware of
it.,,s3
The Third Circuit found that the accountants' liability at trial
had been based solely on the inaccuracy of the accounts re-
ceivable entry on the balance sheet. The court then concluded
that the circumstantial evidence did not support an inference
that the accountants must have been aware of the risk that
the accounts receivable item was misleading.3 4 In doing so, the
Third Circuit segmented its analysis of each purported sale
and found that even where there were clear questions no fac-
tors standing alone were evidence that the accountants knew
that they lacked the knowledge required to form an opinion
on the sales.35 In short, the Third Circuit made conclusions
based on its interpretation of the facts (which differed from
the district court's findings) and found that the accountants'
misfeasance only amounted to negligence, and that the requi-
site scienter was not present.36
33. 599 F.2d at 1198 (citations and footnotes omitted). The McLean formulation
of the recklessness standard was adopted in Seiffer v. Topsy's Int'l, [1979-80 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 97,352 at 97,344 (D.Kan. March 19, 1980).
34. Id. at 1199, where the court said:
Although the defendants contended these sales had occurred, testimony by
agents of L.B. Smith, Robbins, and Southern Laser established to the satisfac-
tion of the court that the sixteen transactions were in the nature of consign-
ments. There was no evidence that Schiavi, the C & S partner in charge of the
audit, had actual knowledge of the consignment arrangements, or even that he
was aware of the risk that they were consignment sales. Thus C & S could be
held to have the requisite scienter only if the investigation it made, and the
knowledge it had, give rise to an inference that it "must have been aware" of
the risk that the accounts receivable item was misleading. Upon examination
of the evidence bearing on Schiavi's investigation of the four questioned ac-
counts, we conclude that such an inference was not permissible in this case.
.35. The court also noted that the plaintiff had "presented no testimony as to the
standard of care in the accounting profession." Id. at 1200 n.19. This failure to pre-
sent such proof may have been the decisive factor of the case.
36. At trial the district court found that the accountants, in order to check ac-
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Consequently, McLean does not seem to affect the legal
standard for accountants' liability. Its factual findings, how-
ever, are instructive and will fuel the accountant's arguments
that (1) recklessness must be the equivalent of willful fraud3 7
counts receivable, sent out four positive confirmation requests, only one of which was
returned. The returned request disputed more than one third of the amount shown
on the company's books. With respect to two of the other requests, the accountants
received telegram messages which referred to the customers' respective purchase or-
ders but which did not confirm an amount due and owing. The accountants made no
efforts to contact the customers and verify the telegrams and in fact one of the tele-
grams was a fake and the other was fraudulently obtained by the company. In addi-
tion, the "purchasing" companies stated at trial that these were only consignments.
The district court found:
Thus, without having received positive confirmations from three of four ac-
counts representing nearly 90% of the dealer receivables and having no per-
sonal knowledge about any of the dealers since they were all new accounts,
Schiavi issued a certified audit indicating that the accounts receivable were
genuine. Further, without any documentation or management inquiry as to the
dealers' financial status, he stated that the accounts were "Considered Fully
Collectible."
420 F. Supp. 1057, 1070 (D. Del. 1976) (footnote omitted).
The district court also found other serious deficiencies in the accountant's conduct
of the audit: (1) conflicting dates for payment between invoices and purchase orders;
and (2) invoices issued without delivery where the accountants made no inquiry as to
whether the units had been sold at all or were merely assigned to the dealers on a
consignment basis.
The Third Circuit held as follows:
If we were applying a negligence standard we could affirm a finding that given
the one month discrepancy in the due dates between the invoice and the
purchase order, the late issuance of the invoice, and the ambiguity in the tele-
graphic confirmation, Schiavi should have made further inquiry of manage-
ment or of L.B. Smith before concluding that the account receivable was genu-
ine. But we cannot hold that these factors, standing alone, were evidence that
C & S was aware that it was without sufficient knowledge to form that opinion.
Such a holding would obliterate the distinction between tortious conduct re-
quiring scienter, which the Hochfelder construction of § 10(b) demands, and
negligence, which Hochfelder found insufficient.
599 F.2d at 1199-1200.
37. See, e.g., Mallinckrodt Chem. Works v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 420 F. Supp.
231, 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), which, citing Hochfelder, held: "[P]laintiff must prove an
intent to deceive or defraud. Mere negligence will not suffice. At best, only 'reckless-
ness that is equivalent to willful fraud' will suffice." (citations omitted).
See also Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1045 (7th Cir.)
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 87 (1977); Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 554 F.2d 790, 793
(7th Cir. 1977), where the court stated as follows:
In view of the Supreme Court's analysis in Hochfelder of the statutory scheme
of implied private remedies and express remedies, the definition of 'reckless
behavior' should not be a liberal one lest any discernible distinction between
'scienter' and 'negligence' be obliterated for these purposes. We believe 'reck-
less' in these circumstances comes closer to being a lesser form of intent than
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and (2) the accountants possess a good faith defense.
In Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 8 the District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, based on the special ver-
dict of a jury, found that an agent of the accountants pos-
sessed the requisite scienter. The jury found there were mate-
rial misrepresentations and omissions in an opinion letter
regarding the tax status of tax shelter partnerships. Although
the court employed the recklessness scienter standard, it
avoided the pitfalls of the district court in McLean. The
Sharp court's selection of the recklessness scienter standard
was founded upon the Third Circuit's pronouncement in
Coleco Industries, Inc. v. Berman,3 9 and its instruction to the
jury was based upon the definition of recklessness stated in
Franke v. Midwestern Oklahoma Development Authority.40 It
should be noted that, unlike McLean, the plaintiffs in Sharp
presented expert testimony that the accountant's opinion let-
ter was reckless on its face.
In Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Hor-
wath,41 defendant accounting firm was held liable for its "ma-
terially misleading" treatment, in its submitted audit, of facts
known to it. 42 There, the accounting firm was presented with
documentation of purported real estate sales transactions and
determined, in consultation with and under pressure from its
client, on a form of inclusion and presentation of those trans-
actions in the client's financial statements with footnotes and
a qualified opinion. Specifically, land was sold with a small
down payment to a weakly capitalized corporation under cir-
cumstances making collection problematical and the nature of
the contract doubtful. The auditors, Laventhol and Krekstein,
after extensive study by various members of the firm, refused
to recognize the full $2,030,500 gross profit and instead lim-
merely a greater degree of ordinary negligence. We perceive it to be not just a
difference in degree, but also in kind.
Accord, Pegasus Fund v. Laraneta, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 97,281, at
96,993 (9th Cir. Feb. 14, 1980).
38. 457 F. Supp. 879, 888-89 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
39. 567 F.2d 569 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 830, rehearing denied, 439
U.S. 993 (1978).
40. 428 F. Supp. 719, 725 (W.D. Okla. 1976). See text accompanying note 24
supra.
41. 540 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1976).
42. Id. at 34.
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ited recognition to $235,000 consisting of $50,000 cash re-
ceived and $185,000 promised as liquidated damages in the
event of the buyer's default. A footnote to the income state-
ment described the contract and the accountants' letter ac-
companying the report stated that the opinion was qualified
"subject to the collectibility of the balance receivable on the
contract of sale.14 3
Both the district court4 4 and the Second Circuit found the
financial statements to be materially misleading, the circuit
court holding that the "vice of the report was its representa-
tion that the Monterey transactions were consummated and
the concomitant statement that current and deferred profit
had been realized. ' 45 The Second Circuit further found that
the labelling of a portion of the profit as "deferred" as op-
posed to "unrealized" gross profit aggravated the misleading
impression, rendering the qualified opinion insufficient be-
cause the accountants "did not provide a clear explanation of
the reasons for the qualification."'
The Second Circuit found the Hochfelder scienter require-
ment to be fully satisfied, stating that "[t]he accountants here
are not being cast in damages for negligent nonfeasance or
misfeasance, but because of their active participation in the
preparation and issuance of false and materially misleading
accounting reports upon which Herzfeld relied to his dam-
age."' 47 Consequently, the Herzfeld case is authority for ac-
countants' liability for knowingly and recklessly issuing false
and materially misleading statements. 8
43. Id. at 31.
44. 378 F. Supp. 112 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
45. 540 F.2d at 37.
46. Id. at 36.
47. Id. at 37 (emphasis added).
48. Defendant accountants successfully avoided liability on these grounds in
Oleck v. Fischer, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 96,898 (S.D.N.Y.
1979). There the court found that the financial statements were not materially mis-
leading. Specifically, it was held that a footnote describing loans guaranteed by the
defendant corporation to a former subsidiary was not materially misleading. Conse-
quently, the court, in holding there was no scienter under either the specific intent or
reckless disregard standard, found that the issuance of a "clean opinion" (i.e., one
with no qualifications) was judgmental and amounted to no more than mere negli-
gence. Id. at 95,701. The court also found that the plaintiffs, who were sophisticated
businessmen, had failed to fulfill the due diligence requirement and that the account-
ants' financial statements were not a proximate cause of plaintiffs' loss. Id. at 95,701-
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The result on appeal in the Sixth Circuit in Adams v.
Standard Knitting Mills Inc.,49 however, paralleled the Mc-
Lean case. The district court in Adams found that defendant
Peat Marwick Mitchell & Co. (Peat) had exhibited the requi-
site scienter in that it was aware inter alia of a serious weak-
ness in its client's electronic data processing system and other
internal -weaknesses yet "conducted the audit as though these
problems did not exist."' 0 Peat was held liable by the district
court in part for relying on its client's system of internal con-
trol without reasonable or satisfactory verification and depart-
ing from standard accounting and auditing procedures exhib-
iting scienter.
The Sixth Circuit, in a two to one opinion, reversed, with
the majority taking a different view of the facts, finding as
follows:
The evidence simply suggests a mistake, an oversight, the
failure to forsee a problem. We find nothing in the record
indicating an intent to deceive or a motive for decep-
tion .... No stockholder testified that he was deceived. An
erroneous statement cannot ipso facto prove fraud, and here
we find no evidence of anything other than a negligent
error.
5 1
The majority of the Sixth Circuit painstakingly dismissed the
district court's findings of liability characterizing each as neg-
ligent or immaterial and concluded that Peat "did not forsee
03. See text accompanying notes 59-66 infra.
49. [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 97,382 (6th Cir. May
2, 1980).
50. [1976-77 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) T 95,683 at 90,356 (E.D.
Tenn. 1976). The district court found that the EDP problems "were of such a perva-
sive nature and importance that their existence did, or at a minimum, could have
significantly affected the entire operation of [the corporation] and would therefore
most directly relate to matters contained in the financial statement." Id. at 90,365.
Additionally, the district court found:
Finally, with full knowledge of [the corporation's] deficient EDP and other in-
ternal weaknesses, defendant conducted its 1969 audit as though [the corpora-
tion] was as sound as a dollar used to be - clearly deviating from GAAP [Gen-
erally Accepted Accounting Principles], GAAS [Generally Accepted Auditing
Standards] and the provisions of Peat's own audit manual. Id. at 90,367.
51. [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,382 at 97,514 (6th
Cir. May 2, 1980). As in McLean the Sixth Circuit segmented its analysis rather than




that the bottom would drop out of [the acquirer's] earnings
and that what appeared to be a minor error at the time would
become a major bone of contention." 52 The dissent was sting-
ing and noted that the majority opinion had usurped the fact-
finding functions of the trial court.53
Thus while the standard criteria for scienter are now well
established, the application of the law to the facts continues
to present problems in several circuits.
E. Reliance
"In order to establish reliance sufficient to recover under
Rule 10b-5, plaintiff must prove that defendants' misrepre-
sentations were a 'substantial factor' in determining the
course of conduct which resulted in [its] loss."" With respect
to the financial statements, "[tihere is no requirement that
the plaintiff establish sole reliance or even primary reliance
upon the audit, only that it was a 'substantial factor' in [its]
decision. ' 55 As explained in Herzfeld, "substantial factor"
means a "significant contributing cause. ' 56
52. Id. at 97,514.
53. Id. at 97,520. The dissent stated:
Despite all this evidence of deliberate fraud, Peat has the audacity to assert
that the false, untrue and misleading statements in footnotes 7(c) and 7(d) of
its audit were only 'lapsus calami' (Br. at 5), 'slip of the pen' (Br. at 29), and a
'footnote mistake' (Br. at i). It is unbelievable that the majority of this panel
would swallow with hook, line and sinker such an outrageous and ridiculous
proposition and to hold that Peat's misrepresentation was only negligent and
use it as a basis for reversing a well reasoned opinion of the District Court
thereby depriving the many shareholders of Standard of millions of dollars of
compensation in which they were justly entitled because of the fraud perpe-
trated on them by Peat. Id. at 97,525.
54. Weitzman v. Stein, 436 F. Supp. 895 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (citing Herzfeld v.
Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 540 F.2d 27, 33 (2d Cir. 1976) and List v.
Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. List v. Lerner,
382 U.S. 811 (1965)). Cf. ALI PROPOSED CODE § 220 (stating that both the substantial
factor and reasonable foreseeability tests must be met).
55. McLean v. Alexander, 420 F. Supp. 1057, 1077 (D. Del. 1976) (citing Johns
Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 326 F. Supp. 250, 260 (D. Md. 1971), afrd in part and rev'd
in part on other grounds, 488 F.2d 912 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 916
(1974) and List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub
nom. List v. Lerner, 382 U.S. 811 (1965)). See Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Hor-
wath & Horwath, 540 F.2d 27, 34 (2d Cir. 1976).
56. 540 F.2d at 34. See Oleck v. Fischer, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 1 96,898 (S.D.N.Y. June 8, 1979). With respect to misrepresentations, there
must be an element of causation. Moody v. Bache & Co., 570 F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1978);
Vervaecke v. Chiles, Hieder & Co., 578 F.2d 713 (8th Cir. 1978); Fridrich v. Bradford,
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Similarly, in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States,57 the
Supreme Court held:
Under the circumstances of this case, involving prima-
rily a failure to disclose, positive proof of reliance is not a
prerequisite to recovery. All that is necessary is that the
facts withheld be material in the sense that a reasonable in-
vestor might have considered them important in the making
of this decision. . . . This obligation to disclose and this
withholding of a material fact establish the requisite ele-
ment of causation in fact.58
1. The "Due Diligence" Defense
Accountants often contend that the plaintiffs should be de-
nied recovery because they failed to exercise "due diligence"
in the acquisition or other transaction.59 For any such defense
542 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977); Shapiro v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974).
57. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
58. Id. at 153-54 (citations omitted).
59. The accountants' position has continued to emphasize the reasonableness of
reliance in the context of a negligence framework, which since Hochfelder is obsolete
with respect to the Securities laws. In doing so, they often cite cases decided prior to
Hochfelder. These cases, of course, used a scienter standard approaching negligence
for defendants. See, e.g., Frigitemp Corp. v. Financial Dynamics Fund, Inc., 524 F.2d
275 (2d Cir. 1975); Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402 (3d Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 993 (1976); Vohs v. Dickson, 495 F.2d 607 (5th Cir. 1974); City Nat'l
Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905 (1970).
In Vanderboom the court formulated the following test for reasonable reliance
under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5: "[Wihether a reasonable investor, in light of the
facts existing at the time of the misrepresentation and in the exercise of due care,
would have been entitled to rely upon the misrepresentation." Id. at 230.
In footnote 10 to its opinion, the Vanderboom court amplified on plaintiff's bur-
den of proof:
Not only should the plaintiff have to prove that he relied on the defen-
dant's statements, but he must convince the trier of fact that his reli-
ance was reasonable under all the circumstances at the time. In this way
recovery would be denied to those who, because of their "business so-
phistication," acumen, or ready access to the information involved,
could reasonably be expected to exercise a higher degree of care and
investigation in their dealings.
[T]he objective standard of a reasonable investor exercising due care in
light of all facts effectively imposes a duty of reasonable investigation, thereby
limiting the class of investors who will be protected under 10b-5(2) to consci-
entious buyers and sellers in good faith.
Id. at 230 n.10 (quoting Comment, Negligent Misrepresentations Under Rule 10b-5,
32 U. Cm. L. REV. 824, 842-43 (1965)).
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the burden of proof is, of course, on defendants. 60
In the wake of the Hochfelder decision, the courts have
held that, for such a defense to prevail, the plaintiff's so-
called lack of due diligence must have risen to the level of
reckless conduct. The notion is that, if in a 10b-5 case the
defendants' conduct must be shown to have reached the level
of recklessness, then also the defendant cannot prevail unless
he can show that the plaintiff's conduct reached that same
level.61
In Dupuy v. Dupuy,62 the Fifth Circuit said:
We consider that Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder prompts
a change in the law of due diligence, as it is applicable in
10b-5 cases. Both tort law and federal securities policy sup-
port imposing on the plaintiff only a standard of care not
exceeding that imposed on the defendant. Although the "sci-
enter" requirement may still be unsettled, the Supreme
Court has imposed on defendants a standard not stricter
than recklessness. In this case, then, the question should not
be whether Milton acted unreasonably by failing to investi-
gate the condition of Lori Corporation. Instead, the Court
should ask whether Milton intentionally refused to investi-
gate "in disregard of a risk known to him or so obvious that
he must be taken to have been aware of it, and so great as to
make it highly probable that harm would follow."63
In Holdsworth v. Strong," and Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun
Chemical Corp.,65 the Tenth and Seventh Circuits respec-
tively have reached the same conclusion.6
60. Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1048 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977); Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591, 598 (3d Cir.
1976).
61. See, e.g., Kaminsky, Post-Transaction Evidence in Securities Litigation, 19
B.C.L. REv. 617, 659-667 (1978); Comment, The Due Diligence Defense in Rule 10b-
5: The Hochfelder Aftershocks, 11 IND. L. REv. 727 (1978); Comment, Plaintiff's
Duty of Care After Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 73 Nw. U.L. REv. 158 (1978); Com-
ment, A Reevaluation of the Due Diligence Requirement For Plaintiffs In Private
Actions Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 904; Note, Plaintiff's Standard of
Care After Hochfelder: Toward a Theory of Causation, 31 VAND. L. REv. 1225 (1978);
Comment, Due Care: Still a Limitation on 10b-5 Recovery? 61 MARQ. L. REv. 122
(1977).
62. 551 F.2d 1005 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 911 (1977).
63. Id. at 1020 (citation omitted).
64. 545 F.2d 687, 693 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 955 (1977).
65. 553 F.2d 1033, 1048 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977).
66. Cf. ALI PROPOSED CODE § 1704(e) (providing a defense if plaintiff had knowl-
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Accountants also might argue that certain investors were
given preacquisition access to the audited company's records
and should have discovered any problems through the exercise
of due diligence in an independent review of these records.
This defense might arise where the company acquiring the
stock of another engages its own staff, outside consultants or
investment advisors, or its own accountants to do a "limited
review.""
2. Other Defenses
Closely connected to this defense is the additional asser-
tion that the investment decision is made prior to seeing the
final certified financial statements and on the basis of an inde-
pendent investigation. This defense has been upheld on ap-
peal where the trial court found that there was "nothing that
could be said or done . . . [which] would have overcome the
buyer's insistence in investing."68 Similarly, another trial
court has stated as follows:
For purposes of a Rule 10b-5 claim, events occurring af-
ter the commitment to purchase stock has been made are
irrelevant. Issues of non-disclosure, misrepresentation, mate-
riality and reliance are to be determined by the situation
edge of relevant facts or if alleged falsity was obvious). See also Holmes v. Bateson,
583 F.2d 542, 559 n.21 (1st Cir. 1978). But see Oleck v. Fischer, [1979 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,898 (S.D.N.Y. June 8, 1979), in which plaintiffs
did not satisfy the due diligence requirement. The Oleck court quoted as follows from
Hirsch v. du Pont, 553 F.2d 750, 762 (2d Cir. 1977): "The securities laws were not
enacted to protect sophisticated businessmen from their own errors of judgment.
Such investors must, if they wish to recover under federal law, investigate the infor-
mation available to them with the care and prudence expected from people blessed
with full access to information." The Oleck court did not apply a recklessness stan-
dard but found that reasonable investors of the sophistication and experience of
plaintiffs would have conducted a more thorough investigation.
See also Pittsburgh Coke & Chem. Co. v. Bollo, 560 F.2d 1089, 1091-92 (2d Cir.
1977); Competitive Assocs., Inc. v. Leventhol Krekstein, 478 F. Supp. 1328, 1342
(S.D.N.Y. 1979); Long v. Abbott Mortgage Corp., 458 F. Supp. 108 (D.C. Conn. 1978);
Alton Box Board Co., v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 418 F. Supp. 1149, 1155-56 (E.D. Mo.
1976); Caan v. Kane-Miller Corp., [1975-76 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
195,446 at 99,242 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
67. With respect to third parties engaged by the acquiring company additional
questions might arise as to the character of the relationship and the imputation of
the third party's knowledge to the acquiring company.
68. Chelsea Assocs. v. Rapanos, 527 F.2d 1266, 1272 (6th Cir. 1975) (quoting from
the district court's findings).
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and knowledge of the parties at the time they committed
themselves, and not on the basis of subsequent events, even
though they occur prior to "the formal closing date when the
delivery and payment are formally completed and
cleared."69
The success of these defenses, of course, will depend on
the factual circumstances. Such arguments were squarely re-
jected by the Second Circuit in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v.
Ross.7 0 In that case plaintiff's own accountants, Arthur Ander-
son, had been engaged to conduct a purchase investigation
and had been given access to certain of defendant's records
which, it was claimed, could have revealed certain facts that
had been misrepresented. The court considered the defenses
raised therein, and said:
However, Rule 10b-5, as well as the terms of the exchange
agreement, required the Ross brothers to state all material
facts necessary to make other statements not mislead-
ing.... Such a duty is not discharged merely by giving the
purchaser access to company records and letting him piece
together the material facts if he can.7 1
While, in hindsight, defendant-accountants may argue that
the acquisition was a mistake, in most cases not even hind-
sight can justify any claim that the pre-acquisition conduct
was reckless. As the district court said of the certified public
accountants in McLean v. Alexander,72 "The defendant can-
not engage in games of hide and seek by first holding himself
out as an independent expert and then demanding that plain-
tiff himself uncover the inaccuracy of the certified financial
statement. ' 73
F. Damages Under the Federal Securities Law
1. Compensatory Damages
Under the federal securities laws a plaintiff is clearly enti-
69. Pittsburgh Coke & Chem. Co. v. Boo, 421 F. Supp. 908, 923 (E.D.N.Y. 1976),
aff'd, 560 F.2d 1089 (2d Cir. 1977). See also Koch Indus., Inc. v. Vosko, 494 F.2d 713
(10th Cir. 1974).
70. 509 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1975).
71. Id. at 933 (citations omitted).
72. 420 F. Supp. 1057 (D. Del. 1976).
73. Id. at 1079.
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tied to recover for losses attributable to and flowing from de-
fendants' misconduct.7 4 The measure of damages recoverable
for securities law violations is "actual damages on account of
the act complained of."7 5 Except in a merger transaction
where the defect in the proxy solicitation relates to the spe-
cific terms of a proposed merger,76 the actual damage rule pre-
scribed by section 28 is the "out-of-pocket" rule, viz: (1) the
difference between the amount paid and the value received,
and (or) (2) the profits or economic gain realized by the defen-
dants at the expense of the plaintiffs by reason of the stock
sale or merger exchange.7 7 Under the out-of-pocket rule "it is
a well recognized rule that the complaining party is entitled to
be made whole '7 8 and that damages are recoverable only "to
the extent that they can be shown.
79
2. Consequential Damages and Causation
Damage causation in fact must be present and is shown
where "but for" the misrepresentations the investment out-
lays would not have been expended and such losses were a
reasonably foreseeable consequence of those misrepresenta-
tions.8 0 The amount of the loss must have been paid because
of the defendant's acts and omissons, and not due to a super-
74. Nelson v. Serwold, 576 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 970 (1978);
Foster v. Financial Technology, Inc., 517 F.2d 1068 (9th Cir. 1975); Madigan, Inc. v.
Goodman, 498 F.2d 233, 239 (7th Cir. 1974); Estate Counseling Serv., Inc. v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 303 F.2d 527, 533 (10th Cir. 1962); McLean v.
Alexander, 449 F. Supp. 1251 (D. Del. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 599 F.2d 1190
(3d Cir. 1979).
75. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 28(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1976).
76. Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1304-06 (2d Cir. 1973).
77. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 155 (1972); Nelson v.
Serwold, 576 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 970 (1978); Zeller v. Bogue
Elec. Mfg. Corp., 476 F.2d 795, 801-02 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 908 (1973);
Fershtman v. Schechtman, 450 F.2d 1357, 1361 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
1066 (1972); Levine v. Seilon, Inc., 439 F.2d 328, 334 (2d Cir. 1971); Janigan v. Tay-
lor, 344 F.2d 781, 786 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965). See also Jacobs,
The Measure of Damages in Rule 10b-5 Cases, 65 GEO. L.J. 1093 (1977); Mullaney,
Theories of Measuring Damages In Security Cases and the Effects of Damages on
Liability, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 277 (1977). Cf. ALI PROPOSED CODE § 1708.
78. Richardson v. MacArthur, 451 F.2d 35, 43 (10th Cir. 1971).
79. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 389 (1970).
80. Foster v. Financial Technology, Inc., 517 F.2d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 1975);
Madigan, Inc. v. Goodman, 498 F.2d 233, 239 (7th Cir. 1974); cf. ALI PROPOSED CODE




With respect to expenditures made by the defrauded pur-
chaser in an attempt to save a business he purchased, the Sev-
enth Circuit has stated the following rule:
We agree that if plaintiffs can establish the requisite causal
nexus at trial, they are entitled to recover out-of-pocket con-
sequential damages suffered as a result of holding Fidelity
stock....
Accordingly, capital contributions and other expenses of
attempting to save Fidelity may be recoverable. Plaintiffs
must show that each expenditure for which recovery is
sought was a reasonable effort to, e.g., minimize plaintiffs'
losses, or fulfill a fiduciary obligation to Fidelity policyhold-
ers, or comply with the requirements of regulatory agencies.
They must also show that the danger from which Fidelity
was being saved was the pre-existing insolvency concealed
by defendants, and that but for defendants' misrepresenta-
tions, plaintiffs would not have made these expenditures.
We also think that the $18,384 *broker's commission or
finder's fee is recoverable, if but for the misrepresentation it
would not have been spent.8 2
In McLean, plaintiff, after discovery of the fraud perpe-
trated on him, put another $464,751 into the company he had
acquired in an effort to protect his investment and turn the
81. See, e.g., Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1049-51 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977). During merger negotiations, plaintiff entered
into an agreement with the defendant individual to purchase his exercised option on
shares of the merger candidate owned by a third party. At that time, the defendant
individual who had paid 5% of the purchase price to the third party, was recom-
pensed by plaintiff corporation, which agreed to pay the balance of the purchase price
due a month later. The merger fell through for reasons which included plaintiff's dis-
counting the defendant's representations. Thereafter, however, plaintiff purchased
the third party shares paying 95% of the purchase price ($6,360,915). The Seventh
Circuit found that the agreement was only an option and that the shares had been
purchased not because of the defendant's misrepresentations, but because plaintiff's
attorneys had advised plaintiff incorrectly that it was legally obligated to make the
purchase. Accordingly, the court held that the "incorrect legal advice, in conjunction
with sufficient knowledge to show that forfeiture of its down payment was better than
further payments, serves as the superseding cause which breaks the damage causation
chain running to the defendants." Id. at 1051.
82. Madigan, Inc. v. Goodman, 498 F.2d 233, 238-39 (7th Cir. 1974). See also Fos-
ter v. Financial Technology, Inc., 517 F.2d 1068, 1071 (9th Cir. 1975); Estate Counsel-




company around. The defendant argued that plaintiff should
have closed up the business promptly after discovery of the
fraud. The district court held that for plaintiff "to have
ceased operations when he first learned of the bogus sales and
the true nature of the Amvit relationship may well have been
imprudent" ' s and went on to state as follows:
After an early infusion of funds, decreasing amounts were
expended until the close of business in October. There is no
evidence that the business was conducted other than respon-
sibly. From all that is evident, there was no attempt to fore-
close creditors or to throw the business into bankruptcy.
Nor should a businessman who values his reputation have to
resort to such measures in order to confer a benefit upon
those who defrauded him.
A review of the evidence results in the conclusion that
the $464,751 lost during the nine months of McLean's own-
ership and operation was a not unreasonable amount and in
addition was an amount that defendants could reasonably
have foreseen that McLean would invest. Therefore, the
amount of $464,751 will be added to the $100,000 expended
immediately after the closing and a total of $564,751 will be
awarded as consequential damages.8 4
3. Prejudgment Interest
An award of prejudgment interest in a case involving viola-
tions of the federal securities laws rests within the equitable
discretion of the court to be exercised according to considera-
tions of fairness and equity.85 Factors considered by the court
in exercising discretion include fairness, defendants' degree of
wrongdoing, whether interest would be truly compensatory,
plaintiff's alternate investment opportunities, plaintiff's delay
before and during the trial, the delay between the commence-
ment of the action and the trial, consideration of plaintiff's
otherwise nonreimbursable expenses (including attorney's
83. 449 F. Supp. at 1270.
84. Id.
85. Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403, 414 (1962);, Green v. Occidental Petroleum
Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1345 n.8 (9th Cir. 1976) (Sneed, J., concurring); Thomas v.
Duralite Co., 524 F.2d 577, 589 (3d Cir. 1975); Wolf v. Frank, 477 F.2d 467, 479 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 975 (1973); Wessel v. Buhler, 437 F.2d 279, 284 (9th Cir.





Prejudgment interest appears to be calculated on a simple
interest basis8 7 and can begin to accrue on either the date of
the fraudulent transaction or date of outlay,88 on the date of
the discovery of the fraud89 or on the date of the filing of the
action.90 Prejudgment interest is computed on the amount of
the general damage award and naturally can be substantial.9 1
II. PROPOSED FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE
The principles of accountants' liability are much the same
under the American Law Institute's Proposed Federal Securi-
ties Code,9 2 presently being studied by the Securities and Ex-
change Commission, which attempts to establish a unified
scheme of liability. Sections 26213 and 2979' of the ALI Pro-
86. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 516 F.2d 172, 191 (2d Cir.
1975), rev'd on other grounds, 430 U.S. 1, rehearing denied, 430 U.S. 976 (1977).
87. Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 235 F.2d 369, 374 (3d Cir. 1956).
88. See, e.g., Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1051 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977); Malik v. Universal Resources Corp., 425 F.
Supp. 350, 366 (S.D. Cal. 1976).
89. See, e.g., Baumel v. Rosen, 412 F.2d 571, 576 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
1037 (1969).
90. Cf. Competitive Assocs. v. International Health Sciences, Inc., [1975 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1 94,966 at 97,340 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
91. Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033 (7th Cir.) (prejudgment
interest of over $160,616 on a judgment of $334,785), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875
(1977); Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 516 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1975)
(direction to compute interest at the legal rate of 7 1/ % for 3 years and 6% to judg-
ment on a modified judgment of $25,793,365) rev'd on other grounds, 430 U.S. 1,
rehearing denied, 430 U.S. 976 (1977); cf. Norte & Co. v. Hoffines, 416 F.2d 1189,
1191-92 (2d Cir. 1969) (first affirming and on rehearing, remanding for further consid-
eration of a prejudgment interest award of $841,823 on a judgment of $3,513,772),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970).
92. See note 5, supra.
93. ALI PROPOSED CODE § 262 provides in pertinent part as follows:
(a) [General.] "Fraudulent act" includes an act, device, scheme, practice, or
course of conduct that (1) is fraudulent or (2) operates or would operate as a
fraud.
(b) [Inaction or silence.] Inaction or silence when there is a duty to act or
speak may be a fraudulent act.
(c) [Knowledge or recklessness.] Notwithstanding section 262(a), a person en-
gages in a fraudulent act only if he acts with knowledge that his conduct is of a
type specified in that section, or in reckless disregard of whether that is so.
(e) [Company mismanagement.] The existence of a fraudulent act is not pre-
cluded by the fact that it constitutes company mismanagement.
94. ALI PROPOSED CODE § 297 provides as follows:
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posed Code define "fraudulent act" and "misrepresentation"
basically in the language of rule 10b-5. These definitions are
supplemented by the traditional definitions of "fact" and
"material" in section 25615 and 293.96 Section 1602(a) makes it
"unlawful for any person to engage in a fraudulent act or to
make a misrepresentation" in connection with purchases,
sales, proxy solicitations, tender requests and investment
advice. 7
Express liabilities for fraud and misrepresentation are set
forth in sections 1703 through 1707. Two sections in particular
are pertinent to accountant's liability. First, under section
170498 applying to false registration statements, offering state-
(a) [General.] "Misrepresentation" means (1) an untrue statement of a mate-
rial fact, or (2) an omission to state a material fact necessary to prevent the
statements made from being misleading in the light of the circumstances under
which they are made.
(b) [Estimates, etc.] A statement of fact within the meaning of section 256(a) is
not a misrepresentation if it (1) is made in good faith, (2) has a reasonable
basis when it is made, and (3) complies with any applicable rule so far as un-
derlying assumptions or other conditions are concerned.
95. ALI PROPOSED CODE § 256 provides as follows: "'Fact' includes (a) a promise,
prediction, estimate, projection, or forecast, or (b) a statement of intention, motive,
opinion or law. See also section 297(b)."
96. ALI PROPOSED CODE § 293 provides as follows:
(a) [General.] A fact is "material" if there is a substantial likelihood that a
reasonable person would consider it important under the circumstances in de-
termining his course of action.
(b) [Communication with a small number.] When a person is communicating
with a small number of other persons, (1) a fact is "material" also with respect
to a recipient of the communication if the maker of the communication knows
that the recipient considers the fact important in determining his course of
action, or that there is a substantial likelihood that he would so consider it,
although there is no substantial likelihood that a reasonable person would so
consider it, and (2) a fact is not "material," notwithstanding section 293(a),
with respect to a recipient of the communication if the maker of the communi-
cation knows that the recipient does not consider the fact important in deter-
mining his course of action, or that there is no substantial likelihood that he
would so consider it, although there is a substantial likelihood that a reasona-
ble person would so consider it. The burden of proof with respect to section
293(b)(1) is on the recipient and with respect to section 293(b)(2) is on the
maker.
97. ALI PROPOSED CODE § 1602(a).
98. ALl PROPOSED CODE § 1704 provides in pertinent part as follows:
Sec. 1704 [False registration statements, offering statements, and annual
reports.] (a) [Scope of section.] Section 1704 applies (whether or not the par-
ticular registration has terminated or been withdrawn) on proof that an effec-
tive registration statement, an effective offering statement. . . , an annual re-
port filed with the Commission ... , or any other report so filed and
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ments and annual reports, accountants are liable as experts,
provided their consent has been filed,9 9 but only with respect
to statements that purport to have been made by them.100
Under section 1704 it is not necessary for a plaintiff to prove
knowledge or scienter. The defense, however, currently availa-
ble under section 11(b)(3) of the 1933 Act prevails; specifi-
cally, that "after reasonable investigation, [they] reasonably
believed" that their statements were true.101 Second, under
section 1707 accountants may be liable for a press release or
other form of publicity 0 2 which contains a misrepresentation
incorporated by reference in any such filing (1) contained a misrepresentation
or (2) omitted a material fact or document required.
(b) [Defendants.] The following persons are liable for damages under section
1704:
(5) every expert whose consent has been filed under section 2003(e) (but
only with respect to statements that purport to have been made by him); ....
99. ALI PROPOSED CODE § 2003(e) provides in pertinent part as follows:
(e) [Consents.] (1) If an accountant, engineer, appraiser, or other expert
is named as having prepared, certified, or reported on a part of a registration,
offering, or distribution statement, or an annual report filed with the Commis-
sion, or is named as having prepared, certified, or reported on a report, opin-
ion, or valuation for use in connection with such a filing, his written consent
shall be filed with the filing.
(Emphasis added).
100. ALI PROPOSED CODE § 1704(b)(5);
101. ALI PROPOSED CODE § 1704(f)(3)(B), which provides as follows:
(B) with respect to any part of the filing purporting to be made on the
defendant's own authority as an expert (or purporting to be a copy of or ex-
tract from his own report or valuation as an expert), (i) he, after reasonable
investigation, reasonably so believed at the time. . . , or (ii) that part of the
filing did not fairly represent his statement as an expert (or was not a fair copy
of or extract from his report or valuation as an expert), and on learning of the
unfair use of his statement (or report or valuation) he forthwith advised the
Commission and the registrant in writing that he would not be responsible for
that part of the filing;
and is explained further in § 1704(g):
(g) [Standard of reasonableness.] In determining what constitutes reason-
able investigation or care and reasonable ground for belief under section
1704(f)(3), the standard of reasonableness is that required of a prudent man
under the circumstances in the conduct of his own affairs . ...
102. ALI PROPOSED CODE § 1604(c) defines "publicity" as follows:
(c) [Publicity.] it is unlawful for any company, or a person acting on its
behalf, to engage in a fraudulent act in connection with, or to make a misrepre-
sentation in, a press release or other form of publicity (other than a filing)
relating to the company if it is reasonably foreseeable that the fraudulent act
or misrepresentation will induce other persons to buy, sell, or not to buy or sell
securities of the company or of a controlling, controlled, or commonly con-
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made by the defendant with scienter. "Scienter", however, is
defined in terms of "reckless disregard" in accord with current
lower court case law rather than the "intent to deceive, ma-
nipulate, or defraud" language of the Supreme Court in Ernst
& Ernst v. Hochfelder.10 3
Both of the above liability sections, 1704 and 1707, provide
for a defense based upon plaintiff's knowledge if the defen-
dant proves "(1) that the plaintiff bought or sold with knowl-
edge of the relevant facts or documents as they should have
been disclosed or corrected, or (2) that any alleged falsity was
obvious. '104
Reliance is not a requisite for liability in most instances
under the ALI Proposed Code. Section 1707 liability merely
requires that it is foreseeable that the fraudulent act or mis-
representation will induce a purchase or sale.
In determining damages, the emphasis under the ALI Pro-
posed Code is on cause, defined in section 220 in terms of "le-
gal cause" rather than "causation in fact."'105 Where liability
to buyers or sellers under the above sections arises in connec-
tion with false filings or publicity, fraudulent sales or
purchases, or manipulative acts, the burden is shifted to the
defendant to show either partial or complete lack of
causation. 06
Finally, under the ALI Proposed Code accountants may be
liable as principals if they "knowingly" cause conduct or give
substantial assistance to conduct of another person with
"knowledge" that the conduct is unlawful or involves a fraud-
trolled company.
103. ALI PROPOSED CODE § 299.50 defines "scienter": "[Scienter.] A person makes
(or, within the meaning of section 2006(c), causes or gives substantial assistance in
the making of) a misrepresentation with "scienter" if he knows that he is making a
misrepresentation (or a misrepresentation is being made) or acts in reckless disregard
of whether that is so."
The ALI Proposed Code in § 287 expressly declines to define "knowledge," how-
ever: "[Knowledge.] (a) [Dependent on context.] "Know" and its derivatives are not
defined. Their meaning is left to construction in context. But see the definition of
"scienter" in section 299.50."
104. ALI PROPOSED CODE § 1704(e), 1707(e).
105. ALI PROPOSED CODE § 220 provides as follows: "[Caused.] A loss is "caused"
by specified- conduct to the extent that the conduct (a) was a substantial factor in
producing the loss and (b) might reasonably have been expected to result in loss of
the kind suffered."
106. ALI PROPOSED CODE §§ 1708(b) and (e).
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ulent act or misrepresentation. 10 7
III. CONCLUSION
McLean v. Alexander -is the latest in a growing number of
federal court decisions with respect to accountants and audi-
tors allowing less than intentional conduct to satisfy the scien-
ter requirement in establishing a cause of action under section
10(b) and rule 10b-5, thereby filling in the Hochfelder gap left
by the Supreme Court. The tests formulated by these courts
have proved workable, and are reflected in the Proposed Fed-
eral Securities Code promulgated by the American Law Insti-
tute. Under that Code, section 1707 liability requires proof of
scienter defined in terms of reckless disregard, echoing the
language of those federal courts allowing less than intentional
conduct to satisfy the scienter requirement of a section 10b
and rule 10b-5 action. While section 1704 does not expressly
require proof of scienter, a reckless disregard standard is ef-
fectively established by the reasonable belief-reasonable in-
vestigation defense available to accountants.
Under either the federal case law or the ALI Proposed
Code, it appears that the post-Hochfelder shakeout period has
passed for the development of law on the scienter required for
accountant's liability. Accountants, whose work forms the cor-
nerstone of business decisions, must provide the services they
hold themselves out as providing, or must bear the
consequences.




Accountant's Liability Under State Law
An analysis of state law supports the following







Scienter Satisfied by recklessness; Yellow
Creek Logging Corp. v. Dare, 216
Cal. App. 2d 50, 30 Cal. Rptr. 629
(1963).
Evidence Fair preponderance of the evi-
dence; Liodas v. Sahadi, 19 Cal.
3d 278, 562 P.2d 316, 137 Cal.
Rptr. 635 (1977).
Damages Out-of-pocket; CAL. CIV. CODE §
3343 (West 1970) provides for sig-





Discretionary with trier of fact;
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (West
1970).
Discretionary; CAL. CIv. CODE §
3288 (West 1970).
comparison of New York and
New York
Substantially the same; the element
of reliance is often referred to as
"deception" in N.Y.
Satisfied by gross negligence or reck-
lessness; State Street Trust Co. v.
Ernst, 278 N.Y. 104, 15 N.E.2d 416
(1938).
Clear and convincing proof;
Rudman v. Cowles Communica-
tions, Inc., 30 N.Y.2d 1, 280 N.E.2d
867, 330 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1972).
Out-of-pocket; "Actual pecuniary
loss sustained"; no lost profits; Reno
v. Bull, 226 N.Y. 546, 124 N.E. 144
(1919); it is uncertain how flexible
this rule might be. One case held
that "as long as the fraud continued
to operate all loss flowing naturally
from the fraud is recoverable;
Hotaling v. Leach & Co., 247 N.Y.
84, 159 N.E. 870 (1928).
None, unless fraud was wanton or
malicious; Walker v. Sheldon, 10
N.Y.2d 401, 179 N.E.2d 497, 223
N.Y.S.2d 488 (1961).
As of right from time plaintiff parted
with property; Shindler v. Lamb, 25
Misc. 2d 810, 211 N.Y.S.2d 762
(1959); Reno v. Bull, 226 N.Y. 546,




Form of deceit; intent to induce action
is sufficient and this may be inferred
from knowledge that third party will
rely on representation. Gagne v.
Bertran, 43 Cal. 2d 481, 275 P.2d 15
(1954). As a form of deceit, there is no
privity requirement.
I. Negligence
Elements Traditional negligence elements:
duty; breach of duty; proximate
cause; injury.
Evidence Fair preponderance; CAL. Evw.
CODE § 115 (West 1966).
Damages Recovery for damages proxi-





No; Ebaugh v. Rabkin, 22 Cal.
App. 3d 891, 99 Cal. Rptr. 706
(1972).
Discretionary with trier of fact;
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3288 (West
1970).
No separate cause of action for negli-
gent misrepresentation. It exists as
such only as a form of negligence;
privity required unless it can be
shown defendant could anticipate
parties would rely on their represen-
tations. CIT Financial Corp. v.
Glover, 224 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1955);
White v. Guarante, 43 N.Y.2d 356,
372 N.E.2d 315, 401 N.Y.S.2d 474
(1977); Ultramares Corp. v. Touche,
255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
Same; for negligent misrepresen-
tation the courts also require that
defendant know the information is
desired for a serious purpose; that
the recipient will rely on it and that
he will be injured if it is false or erro-
neous. International Products Co. v.
Erie Railroad, 244 N.Y. 331, 155
N.E. 662 (1927).
Same; 41 N.Y. JUR. Negligence § 117
(1965).
Same; Steitz v. Gifford, 280 N.Y. 15,
19 N.E.2d 661 (1939).
No; 14 N.Y. JUR. Damages § 181, at
43 (1969).
Same; Johnson v. Scholz, 276 App.
Div. 126, 93 N.Y.S.2d 334 (1949).
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